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In this paper, we empirically examine the response of
bank holding company stock returns over the period1964
to 1989 to changes interstate banking laws. We find that
returns respondnegativelyandsignificantlyto an increase
in the numberofeligible source statesfrom which acquir-
ing banking firms can enter the bank holding company's
headquarters state. In addition, the negative effects are
stronger in the absence ofreciprocity requirements and
weaker in the presence ofa market that already is rela-
tively competitive. We conclude that interstate banking
tends to enhance potential and/or actual competition
in state banking markets, particularly those formerly
restricted.
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Since the late 1970s, many states have enactedinterstate
banking legislation. These laws permitbank holding com-
panies headquartered in selected other states to operate
bank subsidiaries in their state. Recently, bills have been
introduced in Congress to liberalize interstate banking
laws to permit banks to operate their own branches across
state lines. l
Proponents ofsuchlegislation arguethatcomplete elim-
ination of interstate banking restrictions would generate
some significant benefits, including a more efficiently
configured banking industry, and would invigoratecompe-
tition in the commercial banking market. Opponents are
concerned that interstate branching would lead to exces-
sive concentration and ultimately to a less competitive
banking market.
In this paper, we examine the effect ofliberalization of
interstate banking by studying individual bank stock re-
turns over the period 1964 to 1989. The patchwork liberal-
ization of interstate banking laws over this period had the
effect of varying the number of states from which bank
holding companies could enter various state markets. We
find that individual bank stock returns reacted negatively
to these legislative changes, consistent with the hypothesis
that interstate banking increases potential and/or actual
competition. For banks in general, this negative effect on
returns appears to be stronger than any positive effects that
would stem from potential economies ofscale or scope or
from the benefits of asset diversification.
The remainderofthe paper is divided into five sections.
In Section I, we discuss the legal background ofinterstate
banking laws. In Section II, the theory regarding the
potential effects ofinterstate banking is presented and we
present the findings of previous researchers. Section III
discusses the methodological approach that we employ,
and the data used. We present the empirical findings in
Section IV, followed by adiscussion ofpolicy implications
in Section V.
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Interstate banking restrictions originate in laws passed
earlier this century. The McFadden Act, originally passed
in 1927 and amended in 1933, effectively prohibited inter-
state branching by giving the states, not the federal gov-
ernment, the power to decide whether any bank could
establish branch offices within their borders. The McFad-
den Acthas been interpretedto say that ifstate law is silent
on the issueofinterstatebranching, thenout-of-statebanks
are prohibited from establishing branches in-state.
The McFadden Act left open the possibility of a bank
holding company having separately chartered bank sub-
sidiaries in more than one state. This mechanism ofinter-
state banking was foreclosed, however, by the Douglas
Amendment to the 1956 BankHolding Company Act. The
Douglas Amendment prohibited bank holding companies
from acquiring or establishing banks outside their home
office state unless the laws ofthe state in which the bank
was to be acquired or established explicitly provided for
such entry. In effect, therefore, state law presently deter-
mines the extent of interstate banking.
Recent Liberalization
Beginning in the late 1970s, stateshave passed interstate
banking laws that explicitly provide for the entry ofout-of-
state bank holding companies. 2 The mechanisms per-
mitted by these changes in law involve outside ownership
of in-state bank subsidiaries. It is important to note that
these laws do not permit out-of-state banks to set up or
acquire in-state branches. There are three main distinc-
tions to be made among interstate banking laws. The first
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Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 33pertains to the geographic extent of the zone from which
out-of-state bank holding companies may enter. Under
"regional compacts," entry is permitted only from states
in a surrounding region, with the boundaries ofthe region
determined by the state passing the law. Onthe otherhand,
national interstate banking laws designate the entire coun-
try as the eligible region.
The second distinction pertains to whether the interstate
banking law requires "reciprocity." All ofthe existing re-
gional compacts and some ofthe national laws limit entry
to those states in the eligible region that permit bank hold-
ing companies from the "host" state to enter their state. 3
The third distinction pertains to the permissible means
of entry. Some states permit entry via establishment of a
new (de novo) bank subsidiary, while others require that
entry be via acquisition ormerger with an existing institu-
tion. It appears that all states that permitde novo entry also
permit entry via acquisition.4
Many states have changed their original interstate bank-
ing laws. The effective dates for the different types of
interstate banking laws for each state are shown in Chart
1. 5 In Chart I, interstate banking laws are presented by
region. Because many of the laws are regional reciprocal
laws, this makes it easier to estimate the number ofactual
eligible source states as opposed to potential source states.
As seen in Chart 1, changes have all beenin the directionof
liberalizing the restrictions on entry. For example, a state
may move from a regional reciprocal law to a national
reciprocal ornational nonreciprocal law, orfrom a national
reciprocal law to a national nonreciprocal law.
Chart 1 also shows the number of eligible "source
states."6 As seen in Chart 1, some states have enlarged
considerably the number ofpotential source states in their
regional compact over time.
Currentlyonly Utah, Nevada, RhodeIslandand Virginia
permitinterstate branching.7 As stated in the introduction,
though, legislation has been introduced in both the House
and the Senate to repeal the McFadden Act, which would
allow U.S. banks to branchnationwideirrespectiveofstate
law. The effect ofsuch legislation, should it be adopted, is
an open question. One purpose ofthis paper is to examine
the experience of states with various types of interstate
banking laws in order to infer the effects of interstate
branching.
II. Theory and Previous Research
Because the empirical research in this paper concen-
trates on an examination ofbank holding company stock
returns, which depend on profitability, our discussion
centers around the effect of interstate banking on bank
profits. However, underlying the profitability effects are
effects on bank costs and competition and accompanying
effects on the consumer of bank services. By examining
bank profitability, we hope to infer the relative importance
of these potential cost and competition effects.
Theory suggests that interstate banking may eitherraise
orlower bankprofits. For example, interstate banking may
raise profits by lowering costs, either through scale or
scopeeffects orthrough diversificationeffects. First, to the
extent that interstate banking restrictions are binding,
banks may be forced to operate at a suboptimal scale or to
offer a suboptimally limited range ofservices. Relaxation
oftherestrictions, therefore, mightpermitbanking organi-
zations to operate at a more efficient scale and with a more
efficient scope. As. a result, banks would have lower
operatingcosts and, inthe shortrun atleast, higherprofits.
In the long run, though, we could expect at least some of
these profit gains to be competed away, as consumers face
more favorable prices.
A second effect ofinterstate banking on costs may arise
from the diversification of bank portfolios. To the extent
thatbank portfoliorisk is nonsystematic and thatreturns on
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any nevv' assets are not perfectly positively correlated with
the return on the existing portfolio, the expansion of
business opportunities introduces the possibility of
ing risk iJy diversifYing. If bankruptcy costs are at
partially· borne by the bank, and if diversification is
costless, then diversification raises expected profits and
may eventually benefit consumers, too. 8
Geographic diversification may not be without costs,
however. The management of loan assets requires admin-
istrative input, monitoring of the borrower, and imple-
mentation of covenants and terms. Depending upon the
costliness of these activities, the pure diversification ad-
vant(iges could be offset by the costs ofadministering and
monitoring such varied and far-flung loans. Thus, like the
scale economy effects, the effective impact of diversifica-
tionadvantages of interstate banking is ultimately an
empirical issue.
Interstate banking may affect profitability through its
effect on costs, as just discussed, or through on
competition. Theoretically, interstate banking could
strengthen competition, and lowerprofits, or weaken com-
petition, and raise profits. On the one hand, interstate
banking could lower profits by increasing the threat of
competitive entry in regional banking markets. For exam-
ple, incumbent banks may enjoy above normal if
they can set "limit" prices that are above the competitive
Economic Review / Spring 1991level butlow enoughto deterentry. Entrywillbedeterredif
there are significant learning economies, set-up costs, or
other barriers that make entry into the region at or below
the limit price unprofitable.9
By permitting entry from a larger pool ofexisting bank
holding companies, the relaxation of interstate banking
restrictions increases the probability that one of the pool
will have low enough costs or a large enough store of
wealth to enable the bank to enter and undercut the
incumbents. Anticipatingthis, incumbents may lowerlimit
prices in response to interstate banking liberalization, and
thus experience lower profits. If they do not, the market
may expect that actual entry will increase. Either way, the
expected value offuture profits will decline, to the benefit
of consumers.
On the other hand, the mergers and acquisitions facili-
tated by interstate banking or branching could lead to a
reduction in the number of banks in the nation and,
thereby, decreased competitiveness and increased profita-
bility. While this effect is possible, it relies on the assump-
tion that the relevant geographic market is the nation as a
whole. It seems likely, however, that the relevant market,
for consumerorretail banking services, at least, is smaller
than the nation. 10 Thus, even if interstate provisions de-
crease the number of banking firms in the whole country,
they do not necessarily decrease (and may increase) the
number of banking firms in competition for a region's
consumers. Some banking products, ofcourse, likely have
effective markets larger than a region; business lending,
for example, is probably not locally confined. For such
services, it is possible that interstate banking would
not increase competition, although foreign competition
likely provides a safety valve against undue concentration
ofpower.
We have discussed several hypotheses regarding the
effects of interstate banking, but there are only two pos-
sible effects, if any, on profits-they will either go up or
down. In our empirical work, we will study the effect of
interstate banking on bank profitability and returns. Ifwe
observe that profits go up, it may be because interstate
banking decreases costs, or decreases competition, or
both. In this case, the effect on consumers would be
ambiguous. However, if profits fall, this will suggest an
increase in potential or actual competition, which would
unambiguously benefit consumers.
A numberofprevious studies have attempted to evaluate
the effects of interstate banking. In general, this prior
research has focused on the portfolio or stock price per-
formance ofbanks involved in mergers or acquisitions, or
the comparative performance of interstate and noninter-
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state banking firms. We will now review some of this
past work.
Cost Effects: Economies ofScale and Scope
Born, Eisenbeis, and Harris (1988) examined bank
acquisition announcements. Using a standard market
mociel ofstockreturns, these authors looked at whetherthe
announcement of an agreement to acquire an out-of-state
bank causes "abnormal returns" for the acquiring bank
holding company.11 They find no effect, and state that this
suggests either that there are no benefits to interstate
banking, or that the benefits are distributed to the share-
holders of the acquired firm, as is the case in general,
industrial mergers.12
Goldberg and Hanweck (1988) look directly for econo-
mies-of-scope advantages in interstate banking. These
authors found that grandfathered interstate banking firms
did notenjoy any long-runcompetitive advantage, interms
of market share or profitability, over similar sized non-
interstate banking firms. Goldberg and Hanweckconclude
that interstate banking firms, although they have the op-
portunity to engage in a wider range of activities, are not
in general more efficient than comparable noninterstate
banking firms. 13
This finding is consistentwiththe conclusionsofnumer-
ous, more general studies that have found that economies
related to scale orscope are relatively small. For example,
Berger andHumphrey (1990) used actual average costsfor
all insured commercial banks in 1984 to estimate the
contribution of various factors to differences in average
costs. They estimated differences of25 percent or more in
average costs between the highest and lowest cost groups
ofbanks due to inefficientmanagement, anddifferences of
only 5 percent or less due to scale or product mix.
Cost Effects: Diversification
Otherstudies have examinedthe effectofdiversification
on bank performance. Liang and Rhoades (1988), for
example, investigated whether increases in the geographic
dispersion ofbankoffices decrease the probabilityofbank
insolvency. Specifically, they examined whether the port-
folio effectsofassetdiversificationwereoutweighedbythe
effects of an increase in .administrative and monitoring
costs for the new assets. Liang and Rhoades' empirical
results supported the conclusion that geographic disper~
siondoes reduce the probability of bank insolvency.14
Shouldinsolvency costs be partly borne by banks, this,.in
turn, would imply that banks diversified interstate would
enjoy cost advantages over nondiversified banks. Liang
35and Rhoades also report, however, that geographic diver-
sification was costly to administer; while reducing earn-
ings variance, it also reduced average earnings. On net,
though, diversification was not found to decrease the
market value ofthe banking firm.
Evidence pertaining to the relationship between the
geographic dispersion of bank offices and actual bank
failures can be found in the work ofHilary Smith (1987).
Using data from actual bank closures, Smith finds empiri-
cal evidence that intrastate branching restrictions, which
limit branching to a confined area, increase the incidence
ofbank closure. One may reasonably extrapolate from this
result to say that interstate banking has the potential to
decrease the probability ofbank closure.
Effects on Competition
In addition to effects due to economies ofscale or scope,
or geographic portfolio diversification, interstate banking
may have an effect on the level of actual or potential
competition. Adkisson and Fraser (1990) examined the
effect of interstate banking laws on premiums paid in
actual bankmergers, whether or not the merger was across
state lines.15 They hypothesized that interstate banking
could have two countervailing effects on bank merger
premiums in general. First, they say, interstate banking
may increase competition, thereby lowering the market
value of previously protected banking firms and lowering
mergerpremiums. Second, they maintain, interstate bank-
ing may increase the number of potential bidders for a
particular firm, thereby increasing merger premiums.
Adkisson and Fraser find that the second effect domi-
nated the first effect; that is, bank merger premiums were
largerin states thatpermitinterstatebanking. This does not
mean that competitive effects are absent, of course, but
only that they may be overpowered by the effects ofrivalry
among potential bidders for the (self-selected) sample of
banks acquired. By focusing on actual mergers, therefore,
the Adkisson and Fraser study cannot answer the broader
question ofwhat happens to overall levels ofcompetitionin
bank product markets.
In summary, the available studies suggest that there are
at best modest economies of scale and scope effects, but
that the diversification effects of interstate banking may
be significant. 16 However, it remains an open question
whether interstate banking significantly enhances compe-
tition. To address this question, itis necessary to study the
effects of interstate banking on all banks, not just those
selectively involved in merger and acquisition activity.
HI. Methodology and Data
The methodology employed in this paper is designed to
determine whether relaxation ofinterstate banking restric-
tions enhances competition in commercial banking, or,
alternatively, degrades competition and/or enhances effi-
ciency. As explained above, these two alternatives would
be expected to have opposite effects on bank profitability.
Conceptually, we could make this determination by exam-
ining bankperformance at a portfolio level before and after
changes in interstate banking legislation. The prices of
bank products and the level of bank profits could be
examinedfor evidence ofeffects on costs and competition.
Unfortunately, the quality of price and portfolio infor-
mation on commercial banks is not sufficient to support
such a study. Bank product prices are difficult to obtain,
and are not easily separated from changes in other, qualita-
tive dimensions ofbank products. Similarly, bank balance
sheet and income statement data offer only imprecise
measures ofactual costs, net worth, and earnings because
ofthe use of book value accounting practices in banking.
Those data need to be studied in detail each quarter bank
by bank, as is done by private bank stock analysts,
to derive more accurate estimates of actual bank per-
formance.
Consequently, we have chosen to study the effect of
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interstate banking on costs and competition by using data
on bank stock price behavior. We would expect changes in
profits to be capitalized in share prices and thereby show
up as changes in returns. This approach implicitly relies
upon the analytical assessments ofthe marketplace, which
likely incorporate agreaterinformation setthan that availa-
ble to the researcher. To the extent that stock markets
efficiently incorporate this information, therefore, this
approach offers greater potential precision than the direct
study ofprices or portfolio data.
There are important drawbacks to this approach, how-
ever. First, the stock price methodology confines our study
to the set of banks with traded equity. At present, useful
stock price data are available for fewer than 200 banking
organizations. These organizations account for over 85
percent oftotal banking assets or deposits and, hence, the
effects on these banks likely are the dominant effects in
the banking marketplace generally. However, the self-
selected nature of our sample implies that the results of
our study are not easily generalized to the over 14,000
smaller.institutions we were unable to study, and may be
biased by large bank-specific effects.I7 Additionally, the
relatively thin sample ofbanks limits the degree ofdetail
on the regional banking environment that can be em-
Economic Review / Spring 1991ployed, because some smaller regions are not represented
by traded banks.
Thebasic analyticalmethod thus relates individualbank
stockreturns over time to variables representing the legal
environment and general stock market conditions. The
following basic system of equations describes the statis-
tical analysis in this paper:
0)
where
Rit the dividend-adjusted stock return for bank i in
quartert, measured using the closing stock price
at the end of the quarter
= (Price;t - Priceit __ 1 + Dividendit)/Priceit_ I
Dit a vector of variables, including dummy vari-
ables, that describe changes in laws in period t
Mt the general stock market return
eit a disturbance term
and a, b, and c are estimated coefficients.18
Econometric Issues
A number of econometric issues arose in deriving a
practical estimation relationship from this specification.
First, it was anticipated that the effects of changes in the
law would be unlikely to be captured by a simple, contem-
poraneous dummy variable. It is likely that effects of the
laws would be anticipated, and that the full expected
effects on competition would take time to materialize.
Consequently, leads and lags ofthe explanatory variables,
in addition to contemporaneous levels, were employed in
the final specification of (1).19 To economize on model
parameters, a third-degree polynomial structure was im-
posed on the distribution of lead and lag parameters.20
Second, the issue arose ofwhether to use effective dates
or passage dates for the law change variables. One might
argue that, in a market with rational expectations, the
effects of the implementation of a law would be fully
capitalized into stock prices when the law is passed,
or even prior to that. On the other hand, we have lit-
tle confidence that we can determine the appropriate
"announcement date," given that many analysts and in-
siders may have reliable information prior to when the law
is actually passed. In contrast, the effective date ofthe law
is precisely determined. Given these considerations, we
estimated regressions using both the passage date and the
effective date. However, we report detailed regression
results for the effective date only.
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Third, since the data environment is one of a pooled
time-series of cross-sections (i.e., banks), the issue of
efficiency of the coefficient estimates arises. The direct
estimation of (1) on pooled time-series and cross-section
data can result in inefficient (but unbiased) parameter
estimates unless the coefficient vectors a, b, and c are
constant across banks and over time. Unfortunately, the
most general techniques for addressing this problem are
not emplOYable here because ofour sample size, given our
need toemploylaggedexplanatory variables. However, by
introducing dummy variables for each time period and
bank in equation 0), the importance ofthe cross-sectional
and time-series parameter variation can be explored in a
limited way in our sample. 21
Fourth, it is unlikely that bank stock prices, or stock
prices generally, are in equilibrium over time about a
constant mean level. Thus, it is likely that the chance ofa
particularpositive ornegative deviation in stockprices has
varied across our sample time period, which includes
several record bull markets. The lack of stationarity can
also be a source of inefficiency in parameter estimates.
Most economic time series, however, can be made accept-
ably stationary by first-differencing. This is the rationalein
0) above for studying returns, rather than stock prices, in
the model.
Fifth, unbiased estimation of the parameters on the
interstate banking law variables, D, requires that the
passage of these laws be statistically exogenous to the
stock return variable. Similarly, the bank structure vari-
ables, S, also must not be endogenous to bank stock
returns. In practice, it is unlikely that significant banking
legislation or other structural aspects of banking markets
are determined completely independently ofthe character-
istics and condition of a region's banks. Thus, there is
the potential for self-selection or simultaneous equations
bias to be introduced if the law dummies are treated as
exogenous.
In the context of this study, however, it is unlikely that
this bias is significant since stock prices are likely to have
capitalized any cross-sectional variations in legislative
control by the banks; legislative changes likely take place
in reaction to broader regional economic and banking
conditions, and not quarterly variation in stock returns.
Thus, in a statistical sense, the effectoflegislative changes
on stockreturns is likely to dominate the reverse effect.
Finally, in a time series setting, the issue of bias in
attrition orentry into the dataset must be considered. That
is, banks that leave the sample (by failure or merger) or
enterthe sample (by virtueofbeinganew bankorbynewly
offering shares for public trading), may be different from
37otherbanks. In the contextofthis study, attrition andentry
are hypothesized to be an integral part ofthe process that
will affect stock returns' reaction to interstate banking
laws. Hence, no control for sample attrition or entry is
attempted.
Data Considerations
Anextensivedatabase was assembledtotestthe effectof
interstate banking laws on bank returns. Bank stock re-
turnsdatawere obtainedfromtheCompustatdatafile. This
data file contains share price and returns information for
about 150leadingU.S. bankholdingcompanies during the
period 1964 to 1989.22
The resulting data are comprised ofthe quarterly obser-
vations on 174 bank holding companies.23 Returns are
calculated using the closing stock price at the end of the
quarter (adjusted for stock splits) and the common divi-
dend paid per share by the ex-dividend date. The CRSP
tapes were used as the source for the overall market returns
variable used in the empirical work discussed below. The
daily returns on the Standard and Poor's Composite Index
were converted to quarterly returns by summing the daily
returns in each quarter.
Information on interstate banking laws was assembled
from numerous sources, includinga table from theBanking
ExpansionReporter, a fact sheetobtained from the Ameri-
canBankers Association, and Baer and Gregorash (1986).
Specifically, data was assembled on features ofthe various
state laws affecting interstate banking, and the dates of
passage and the effective dates of these laws. The laws
were classified as to their reciprocity conditions (Recipro-
cal versus Non-reciprocal), and their entry restrictions
(AcquisitionversusDeNovo).24Inaddition, the numberof
potential and actual "source" states was calculated for
each state at every point in time. Much ofthis information
is summarized in Chart 1.
Information also was assembled on one aspect of the
structural characteristics ofbanking markets.. Specifically,
informationonintrastatebranching restrictions for the year
1983 was obtainedfrom theAnnualStatisticalDigestofthe
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.25
Anticipated.Effects
The theoretical and data considerations resulted in an
empirical implementation of (1) in the form ofan ordinary
least squares regression of bank stock returns on the
explanatory variables in Table 1.
The emphasis ofthe estimationofthe effects ofthe laws
ison the variable called Change in States.26This measures
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the increase in the number of potential source states that
resultsfromthechange inthe law. (Ifthere is no increase in
thenumberofsource states inthis quarteroverlastquarter,
this variable is zero.) Ifthe market expects that interstate
banking will have the predominant effect of increasing
home state bank competition, an increase in Change in
States shouldresultin a reduction inreturns to bankequity
holders, and a negative sign on this variable. (In Table 1,
column 3, this is referred to as the Rent Depleting Model,
orRDM.)
Alternatively, liberalization couldbeperceived as work-
ing to the advantage ofhome banks by permitting them (to
the extent they activate other states' reciprocal laws) to
entermore states, thereby enhancingprofits through diver-
sificationeffects, orperhapsthrough scaleorscopeeffects.
Likewise, because liberalization wouldbroadenthepool of
potential acquirers, it might increase the potential diver-
sification, scale, or scope benefits of merging with home
banks. Finally, ifcompetition were to decrease, surviving
banks wouldall see increasedrents. Whethersuchbenefits
would show up in the stock returns of home banks as
acquirers, or as acquirees, this Rent Enhancing Model
(REM in Table 1) would predict that the coefficient on the
Change in States variable would have a positive sign.27
Note that the structure of the model implies that a
positive change in the number ofsource states will have a
stronger effect, the greater the change. This is consistent
withthe hypotheses discussed above regarding the sources
of interstate banking's potential effects on costs and/or
competition.
The two main variations in interstate banking laws are
whether the law requires reciprocity and whether the law
permits de novo entry. The effects of these variations are
studiedby interacting dummy variables with the Change in
States variable.
The coefficient on the variable that interacts Change in
States withtheReciprocal Dummy shouldreveal the extent
to which reciprocity requirements influence the effective-
ness. ofthe increase in the number of source states.28 The
reciprocity requirement essentially makes the actual num-
berof source states less than the potential number repre-
sented by the Change in States variable. To the extent that
the main effect of interstate banking is pro-competitive
(the Rent Depleting Model), we expect the sign on this
interaction term to be positive. From the viewpoint of a
home state bank as an acquisition target, however, rec-
iprocity requirements limit the potential benefit to be
gainedfrom being acquired and, therefore, may modify
any increase in stock price due to the Change in States
variable.
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interstate banking laws is whether they permit.de novo
entry.29 From the standpoint ofthe Rent Depleting Model,
allowing de novo entry would be expectedto enhance the
pro~competitive effect of liberalization by affording an
alternative means of entry beyond direct acquisition. A
negative sign then would be expected on the interaction of
the De Novo Dummy with the Change in States variable.
pnlctl:ce, however, the de novo feature of interstate
banking laws is unusual, and in ourdata setoftradedbank
stocks, data on the banks of Ohio, New York, and New
Jersey dominate the actual instances of affected banks
(although morestates permitde novo entry). Thus, there is
some possibility that the De Novo Dummy will simply
capture the effects ofparticular conditions in these states.
For example, intrastate bank competition already is very
vigorous in these three states, so that allowing interstate
entry may have very little procompetitive effect within the
home states, butmay, through reciprocalprovisions, addto
the ability of banks domiciled in these states to expand
elsewhere, thereby enhancing their potential profitability
and, hence, their expected return. To the extent that thisis
the case, the interaction ofthe De Novo Dummy with the
Changein Sta~esvariable would be detecting effects akin
totheRentEnhancing Model, and would be expected to
have a positive sign.
We also interact the Change in States variable with a
dummy variable indicating whether or nOLthe. state has
statewide branching.3D If the state has statewide branch~
ing, we. can expect the level of competition to be higher
than.ifit has limited branching or unit banking.31 This
would mean thatthe amount ofexcess profits that could be
competedaway with new entry would be less, and, conse~
quently, thatanydrop inreturns would be less. Thus, under
the Rent Depleting Model, the interaction ofthe Statewide
DUfiunywiththe Change inStates variable would have a
positive sign.
A.lternatively, under the Rent Enhancing Model, the
existence· of statewide branching, and, consequently,
larger bankingorganizations pre~interstate banking, may
mean fewer benefits tobehad from scaleorscopeeffects or
diversification effects. Thus, under the Rent Enhancing
FederalReserve Bank ofSan Francisco 39Model, the interaction of the Statewide Dummy with the
Change in States variable would have a negative sign.
The remaining variable in Table I is entered to control
for general market conditions which may affect the real-
ized return. The Market Return variable is intended to
capture the time serial influence of the general market on
bank stock returns. The coefficient on this variable can be
interpreted as the "beta" ofthe bank stocks in oursample.
Hence, it is expected that this variable would have a value
near positive 1.0.
As shown in Table 1, we do not include the Reciprocal
Dummy, the De Novo Dummy, nor the Statewide Dummy
in the regression by themselves. Thus, the specification of
the regression does not permit these variables to influence
the constant term. However, we did estimate a simplified
version of the regression with the dummy variables in-
cluded by themselves, in addition to being included in
interaction terms.32 The results of this regression were
consistent in all important respects with those ofthe main
regression that we reportbelow. In general, the coefficients
on the dummy variables by themselves were insignificant,
and the other coefficients were either insignificant or had
the same sign as in the main regression.
IV. Regression Results
The results of the regression described above are re-
ported in Table 2. 33 The coefficients from the full model
are presented, along with a Partial Model that employs
only the Change in States variable (along with the Market
Return variable). The sample mean ofthe dependent vari-
able is .0357. The regression results reported in Table 2
were obtained using the effective dates ofthe laws to date
changes. The results using the passage dates were similar
and will be discussed below.
The results strongly support the notion that the long-run
effect ofliberalized interstate banking is to enhance bank-
ing competition. We turn first to the Partial Model, which
contains only the Change in States variable. The coeffi-
cients on the various leads and lags suggest that the effect
ofexpansion in the number ofsource states has little effect
on returns three and two periods prior to the implemen-
tation date, but, starting in the immediately preceding
quarter, significantly depresses the affected banks' stock
returns. This finding is consistent with the Rent Depleting
Model ofthe effect of interstate banking.
Summing the coefficients on Change in States over the
seven periods in the distributed lag formulation indicates
the total effect, over time, ofan increase in the number of
eligible source states. The sum of these coefficients is
strongly significant, and quite large. In effect, at the
sample mean, one additional source state reduces affected
banks' quarterly stock returns by about 3 percent for each
of seven quarters.
The "beta" of stock price returns to the market is very
close to one at .99 and is a significant contributor to the
variance ofbank stock returns.
In the Partial Model, the only parameter describing the
law is the Change in States variable. In the Full Model, this
variable is interacted with dummies measuring three other
variations: reciprocal versus non-reciprocal (the Recipro-
cal Dummy), the case of allowed de novo entry versus
prohibited de novo entry (the De Novo Dummy), and
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statewide branching versus restricted branching (the State-
wide Dummy).
In the Full Model formulation, the coefficients on the
Change in States variable by itself capture the case of
a non-reciprocal, non-de novo law in a state with re-
stricted branching. Consistent with the Rent Depleting
Model, all of these coefficients are negative and sig-
nificant, and many are strongly significant. Consequently,
the sum of the various coefficients is negative and very
strongly significant. The evidence suggests that the market
reacts quite negatively to an increase in the numbei of
source states.
If the broadening of interstate banking occurs in the
context of a reciprocal law, however, the negative effects
of an increase in the number ofregional source states are
not as strong. This is seen in Table 2, where all of the
Change in States X Reciprocal coefficients are positive,
and all but the third period lag coefficient are significant.
The sum also is positive and significant. These results are
consistent with the explanation given in the Rent Depleting
Model that reciprocity requirements effectively limit po-
tential entry.
The coefficients on the variable interacting Change in
States and the De Novo Dummy are positive, yet insignfi-
cant, both individually and in their sum. It may be that a
de novo provision does not significantly influence the effect
of interstate banking laws, at least at the effective date.
(Below, we will discuss the effect ofde novo provisions at
the passage date for the law.) On the other hand, as
discussed above, the banks of only three states dominate
the actual instances of banks in our sample in de novo
states. Therefore, we may not have enough data to accu-
rately isolate the effects ofthe de novo provision from any
effects that may be particular to these three states.
Statewide branching appears to mitigate the negative
response to an increase in the number ofsource states. All
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Statewide variable are positive, and the sumis positive and
significant. These results are consistentwith the prediction
of the Rent Depleting Model that statewide branching
leaves relatively little in the way of excess profits for
interstate banking to erode.34
Both the Partial Model and the Full Model also were
estimated using the dates when the interstate banking laws
were passed instead ofthe dates when the laws went into
effect. Throughout the following discussion, the reader
should keep in mind that we have relatively little confi-
dence in the accuracy ofour passage dates. This does not
meanthatwe do not know the dates when the laws were
passed by the state legislatures, but rather, that we do
not know the dates when the market began to assimilate
the information that interstate banking legislation would
be passed.
In most respects, the results obtained using the passage
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effective dates. In the Partial Model, all ofthe significant
coefficients on the Change in States variable (the coeffi-
cients on the first, second and third period lags) were
negative. However, although the sum ofthe distributed lag
coefficients was negative, it was insignificant.
Most important,though, all the Change in States coeffi-
cients were negative and significant, as was the sum, in the
Full Model with passagedates. In addition, the sumofthe
coefficients on the Change inStates X Reciprocal variable
was positive and significant, as before. The sum of the
Change in States X De Novo coefficients was positive, as
before,but, this time, significant. The sum of the Change
in States X Statewide coefficients was positive, as before,
but insignificant.
We have found that the market responds, in a qualita-
tively similar way, to both the passage andthe implementa-
tion ofinterstate banking laws. This suggests not only that
the passage ofsuclllaws constitutes newinformation, but
that their implementation supplies significant additional
information, information which reinforces the original
response. This may be because, when the law is passed,
there is considerable uncertainty concerning the environ-
mentin which the law will become effective, whereas there
is no such uncertainty at the effective date.
Infact, ourresults suggestthat, in some importantways,
the response of returns to the laws' implementation is
somewhatstrongerthantheirresponseto the laws' passage,
subject to our dating of passage and enactment. For
example, in the Partial Model, the sum of the Change in
States coefficients is significant when using the effective
date but insignificant when using the passage date. In
addition, this sum is slightly larger in absolute value and
slightly more significant in the Full Model with the ef-
fective date (.027, with an absolute t-statistic of 13.73)
than in the Full Model with the passage date (.019, with an
absolute t-statistic of12.31). Also, the branching status of
the state affects the response at the implementation date,
but not the response at the passage date.
Several factors might influence the absolute size and
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significance ofthese coefficients. Forexample, the amount
of new information that is supplied to the market and the
significanceofthe informationfor currentreturns wouldbe
important. The significance of a given amount of new
information will be less, the more distant in time is any
expected change in profits. This is because the present
discounted value of a given adjustment in future profits
will fall the farther off is the adjustment. This is.one
possible explanation for the relative size and significance
ofthe coefficients on Change in States in the two versions
ofthe Partial and Full Models.
An alternative explanation may be that we have a more
accurate dating fortheimplementation than for the "pas-
sage" ofthe laws. The inability to pinpoint exactly when
new informationoninterstate bankinglaws mighthave first
appeared would contribute to the inefficiency of coeffi-
cient estimates in the passage date regressions. We have
some evidence that this may be the case. We estimated a
passage dateregression with Change in States interacted
with the number of days until implementation of the law
included.35 The capitalized value offuture changes should
be lowerthe farther away is implementation, so this inter-
action term should be positive, given negative coefficients
on Change in States. We found that the interaction terms
were indeed positive, but insignificant. This lends some
support to the notion that we do not have an accurate
measure ofthe passage date.
Despite this concern, the significance of the positive
sum ofthe coefficients on Change in States X De Novo in
the passage date estimation of the Full Model deserves
some discussion. As mentioned above, it is likely that the
states that empirically have incorporated de novo features
may be those that already are highly competitive. Hence,
the effect in those states ofexpanded interstate banking is
more likely to be in the form ofdiversification advantages
to the home state banks as they are now able to enter all of
those states whose reciprocal banking laws permit such
entry. Apparently this effect shows up at the passage date,
and no additional significant effect shows up at the ef-
fective date.
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The empirical workin this papersuggests that interstate
banking, particularly when unrestricted by reciprocity re-
quirements, tends significantlytoenhancepotentialand/or
actual competition in state banking markets.36 There is
little evidence to support the alternative hypothesis that
interstate banking results in significant cost savings due to
scale, scope, ordiversification effects and/orconsolidfltion
that yields less competitive banking conditions. Bank
holding company stock returns respond negatively and
significantlyto an increase in the numberofeligible source
states from which acquiring bank holding companies can
enter. This effectshows up atboththe passagedate andthe
effective dateofthe interstate bankinglaw, suggesting that
there is new information thatcomes to the marketonce the
law is actually implemented. In addition, the negative
effects are stronger in the absence of reciprocity require-
ments and weaker in the presence of a market that is
already relatively competitive, as indicated by statewide
branching provisions.37
Conceivably, ofcourse, the findings in this paper could
evolve in the long-run as interstate consolidation proceeds.
However, in the time frame ofour data, the effects seem to
evolve in a directionconsistentwith more, ratherthan less,
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banking competitIon over time. In addition, although
depressionofstockreturns appears to bethe overall effect
ofincreasing the number ofsource states, there do appear
to be conditions under which the returns of individual
banksinparticularstatesmaybenefitfrom liberalizationof
interstate banking. Thus, the overall impacts have some
state-by-state variations, and stock analysts will have to
examine the particularcircumstancesoffurtherliberaliza-
tion of state banking laws to discern their effects on
individual bank stocks.
Finally, it is important to underscore the limitations of
the empirical work presented here. The sample ofbanks
studied here is not necessarily representative ofthe large
number of small banks in the nation. Thus, althoughit
seemsthatinterstatebankingincreasescompetitionamong
medium- and large-sized banks, its specific effects on
small banks depends upon their competitive relationship
with the larger banks in their states. Also, our focus on
stock market returns, rather than the actual accounting
experienceofindividual banks, leaves open the possibility
thatwe have capturedthe market'sexpectations, butnotthe
reality, about the long-run effects of interstate banking.
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1. See Trigaux (1990).
2. Maine enacted the first interstate banking law, in 1975.
The law did not become effective, though, until 1978. It
was a number of years before interstate banking was
introduced in any other state; New York was the second,
passing a law that became effective in 1982.
3. Oregon is the only state that ever had a regional
nonreciprocal interstate banking law. In 1989, a national
nonreciprocal law went into effect in Oregon.
4. Some interstate banking laws contain additional provi-
sions such as ceilings on out-of-state control of bank
deposits, minimum age requirem~nts for the ac.quir~e,
required commitments by the acqulrer to community rein-
vestment, or required capital-to-asset ratios for out-of-
state acquirers. Also, some laws prohibit "leapfrogging,"
the entry by a bank holding company headquar.te.red
outside the eligible region, with only atoe-hold subsidiary
in a state in the region.
5. As of 1989, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota had no
interstate banking laws, so they are excluded from the
chart.
6. In Chart 1, the number of states in the eligible region
corresponds to the number of potential states, whether
or not those states have in fact met the reciprocity re-
quirement.
7. See Zuckerman (1990) for a discussion of Utah's new
interstate branching law. Nevada's law is somewhat re-
strictive in that it allows out-of-state banks to set up de
novo branches only in counties with a population below
100,000. It is unclear whether the law will be interpreted
to allow acquisition or merger with existing branches.
(Source: Conversation with the office of the Commis-
sioner, Financial Institutions Division, Nevada Department
of Commerce.)
8. Whether a bank would choose to diversify so as to
reduce risk would depend on a number of factors, includ-
ing the risk preferences of shareholders, the risk pref-
erences of bank managers, and the opportunities for
shareholders to efficiently diversify their asset portfolios in
the securities market. Bank managers' risk preferences
are likely to be affected by the nature of bankruptcy costs
and the existing system of deposit insurance. (See Boyd
and Graham (1986) and Santomero (1984) for further
explication of these issues.)
9. For example, regulators impose a barrier to entry by
requiring experience in banking as a prerequisite for a
new bank charter.
10. See, for example, Keeley and Zimmerman (1985).
11. A market model specifies a particular company's
stock returns to be a function of returns on a well-diver-
sified portfolio of stocks and, perhaps, of other f~ctors
correlated with aspects of systematic or nondlverslflable
risk such as interest rates. In an "event studY," such
as that used by Born, Eisenbeis and Harris, the effects of
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the events on stock returns are isolated by comparing re-
turns around the time of the event with the returns pre-
dicted by the market model. The difference is labelled
"abnormal returns" and is attributed to the effect of the
event under study.
12. See, for example, Jensen and Ruback (1983). The
Born Eisenbeis and Harris finding also is qualitatively
consistent with the finding in de Cossio, Trifts and Scanlon
(1987). These authors find that bidding firms in bank
acquisitions receive significantly higher abnormal returns
when they are involved in intrastate as opposed to Inter-
state mergers, while target firms earn significantabnormal
returns from both intrastate and interstate mergers.
13. Similarly, Rose and Wolken (1990) foun~ that, in unit
banking. and limited branching state~, afflliatl~n :-'lIth a
bank holding company generally proVides no Significant
long-term competitive advantage (in terms of .market
share accumulation) for holding company subsldlanes
over independent banks.
14. Liang and Rhoades calculate the probability of bank
insolvencyto be afunction of the expected net-income-to-
asset ratio, the capital-to-asset ratio, and the standard
deviation of net income-to-assets.
15. The "premium" in a merger is the difference between
the price per share of stock paid by the acquirer ~~d the
price per share just prior to the time thatthe pOSSibility of a
merger first became known to the publiC, In some cases,
the premium is fully capitalized in the market pnce of the
stock and the acquirer pays a price per share corre-
sponding to the market price. In othe~ cases, the acquirer
ends up paying more than the prevailing market pnce per
share. Adkisson and Fraser proxy the base market value
of the firm with the book value of the firm, and measure the
premium as the ratio of the purchase price to the book
value.
16. Despite the evidence cited suggesting the relative
unimportance of economies of scale and scope, one
might still reasonably maintain that such ef.fects are In-
deed important. There are two potentially mitigating fac-
tors that bank cost studies may not adequately take Into
account. First, the FDIC's "too big to fail" policy undoubt-
edly favors large banks over small ones, and this may
have the effect of decreasing large banks' cost of funds.
Second, banks with large branch networks may be prefer-
able, for reasons of convenience, from the bank cus-
tomer's point of view. This may be true even though, for a
given level of services, such banks may produce services
no more efficiently than small banks.
17. As of December 31,1985, there were 15,072 commer-
cial banks in the United States, (Source: AnnualStatistical
Digest.)
18. A previous researcher, Chong (1989), has studied
the effects of the passage of interstate banking laws on
bank holding company stock returns. He estimated atwo-
factor market model, regressing individual daily bank
Economic Review / Spring 1991stock returns on a constant term, the market return, the
twist of the yield curve, and interstate banking law an-
nouncement date dummies, interacted with all the other
independent variables. Chong's inclusion of the market
return and yield curve interaction terms in his regression
seems somewhat arbitrary. It is unclear why, in theory,
interstate banking would affect a bank's exposure to
systematic risk at all. Chong finds that interstate banking
increases banks' profitability and their exposure to market
risk, but not interest rate risk.
Our model differs from Chong's in three respects. First,
we look for effects in quarterly stock returns, not daily
returns. A day seems too short a time frame in which to
detect the effects of changes in laws. Second, we look at
the response of returns around the date when the law
goes into effect, as well as around the date when it is
passed. Third, our specification differs in that we do not
allow interstate banking to affect exposure to systematic
risk, but we do, unlike Chong, allow different types of laws
to have different effects. In addition, we allow the laws to
have different effects in different environments. Because
our model is significantly different from Chong's model,
we do not expect that our results should accord with his.
19. We employed three leads, a contemporaneous term,
and three lags in the specification of the model. Since our
observations are quarterly, this structure allows for a
relatively long period over which interstate banking law
changes can affect bank stock returns. Such a large
window is unusual in atraditional "event study." However,
such studies usually examine the effects of events, such
as merger announcements, that are hypothesized to have
relatively certain consequences at certain times for cer-
tain banks. In contrast, our study examines the effectof an
event whose effects, even in theory, are not as well-
defined in these respects. Therefore, it seems to us rea-
sonable to assume, a priori, that the effects will be spread
out over a relatively long period of time.
20. The estimation of a polynomial distributed lag (PDL)
formulation spares degrees of freedom by introducing a
specific structure to the various lag coefficients. For ex-
ample, using a third-degree PDL to estimate the coeffi-
cients in aten-lag model reduces the number of estimated
parameters from ten to four. The ten coefficients, wo, W1,
... , Wg are replaced by the formula
Wi = Co + c1i + C2i2 + C3i3 i = 0, 1, 2, ... 9
where the cs are the four parameters of the polynomial to
be estimated.
21. One technique is to introduce dummy variables for
every cross-sectional observation and time period. En-
tered in the regression by themselves, they permit the
intercept term, a, to vary across banks and over time. Ad-
ditionally, cross-sectional dummies can be interacted with
the explanatory variables, permitting the slope coeffi-
cients, b, C, and d, to vary cross-sectionally. We were able
to examine time variation in the intercept, but, due to
software limitations, we were not able to examine any
variation in the slopes.
Alternatively, an error-components model can be esti-
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mated directly, permitting the error term eit to be decom-
posed into cross-section specific, time-series specific,
and mixed effects. This technique involves a generalized
least squares estimation technique that is foreclosed
by computation limitations and the necessity to include
le;tggedexplanatqry variables.
22. ThE:). criteria for inclusion in the Compustat bank file
are that the company's stock be actively traded and that
the company has high investor interest. Deletions are
effected upon mergers, suspensions from trading, and
bankruptcy filings.
23. We have bank holding companies in 44 different
states in our sample. Our sample does not contain any
bank holding companies located in Montana, North Da-
kota., South Dakota, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont or
Kansas, but does contain at least one bank holding com-
pany located in Washington, D.C., which is treated as a
S$parate"state.',
24. We also classified the laws according to their geo-
graphic focus (Regional versus National). However, the
effect of this distinction proved to be statistically insignifi-
cant, so we omit it from the reported regression results.
Because we also included the change in the number of
eligible source states as an explanatory variable in the
regression, it is not surprising that the national versus
regional distinction was insignificant.
25..In 1983, 19 of the 44 states represented in our sample
had statewide branching.
26. There are 186 observations in our sample with non-
zero values of Change in States.
27. It may be argued that, just as anticipated diversifica-
tion benefits may cause an increase in the stock price of
potential acquirers and/or acquirees, so may anticipated
competitive benefits. The anticipated increase in profits
due to entry into markets where competition had been
lying dormant may increase the stock price of potential
merger participants. However, we expect that the nega-
tive effects felt by those banks facing increased competi-
tion but not anticipated to be involved in mergers would
outweigh any positive effects felt by potential merger
candidates. On the other hand, we do not expect antici-
pated diversification to have any effect, by itself, on those
be;toks that are not jUdged by the market to be potential
merger candidates. Therefore, for the market as a whole,
diversification should increase stock prices.
28. There are 174 observations in our sample with non-
zero values of Change in States X Reciprocal.
29. There are 51 observations in oursample with non-zero
values of Change in States X De Novo.
30. There are 76 observations in our sample with non-
zero values of Change in States X Statewide.
31. Studies have shown that barriers to entry in the form
of branching restrictions decrease competition in local
banking markets. For a review of these types of studies,
see McCall (1980).
32. As in the main regression, three leads, a contempo-
raneous term, and three lags were included.
4533. The numberof observations is the original number of
observations in the sample, 10,868, minus any observa-
tionsdeleted owing to the lag structure ofthe model.
34. To test further the hypothesis that a relatively com-
petitive banking market sees less of a negative impact
from interstate banking, we also estimated the full model
with a four-firm concentration ratio variable added. Like
the dummy variables, this variable entered in interaction
terms withthe Change in States variables. The estimated
coefficients on these interaction terms were insignificant,
and the signs and. significance .of the othercoe.fficients
were·unaffected.
Theooncentration ratio does not perform as well as
the statewide branching variable. This may be because,
eventhough, on a statewide pasis,. markets in restricted
branching states are not highly concentrated, local mar-
ket power may be substantial.
35. Both these regressions and the original Full Model
regression with passage dates were complicated by the
existence. of legislation which specifies a regional law
with a national trigger date. In such instances, both fu-
ture changes were passed on the same date. Thus, there
are two potential values for Change in States when using
the passage date: the number of states that is to be
included in the region, and the number of states that is to
be added at the time when national interstate banking
goes into effect.
In the original Full Model, we chose 50 for Change in
States in instances when a regional law with a national
trigger date was passed. In the model including the
interaction terms involving the number of dates from pas-
sageto implementation, we defined two Change in States
variables, as described above.
36. In a study ofthe effect ofcompetition on bankcharter
values and risk-taking, Keeley (1990) found that liber-
alized interstate banking does not affect the level of
competition. We do not believe that his result is directly
comparable to our result, since he does not allow for
different effects depending upon the type of law and the
number of states that can enter.
37. In a recent paper, Black, Fields and Schweitzer(BFS)
(1990) find results that are notentirelyconsistentwith ours.
They find that the passage of interstate banking laws
increased the stock returns of regional banking organi-
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zations and decreased the stock returns of money cen-
ter banks.
The authors attribute their results to the differential
treatment of sourcestates with and without moneycenter
banks. Initially, many interstate banking laws prohibited
entry from states in which money center banks are head-
quartered. This means that, all otherthings equal, money
centerbanks faced fewer instances in which their own
states' passage of legislation enabled them, through reci-
procity agreements, to enter other states. Thus, the au-
thors seem to argue, the maineffect of interstate banking
legislation in states with money center banks is to lower
stockreturns through an increase in potential competition.
In regional bank states, they seem to suggest, this neg-
ative rent depleting effect is more than offset by the
positive effectofan increasein thenumberoftargetstates
(through reciprocity agreements).
We estimated regressions that controlled for banksize,
and we did not find this to be a significant determinant
of the qualitative effect of interstate banking legislation.
Because money center and regional banks can likely be
effectively distinguished by size, our results likely dis-
agree with the BFS results; we seem to find a nega-
tive effect on stock returns for both money center and
regional banks.
At leasttwo explanations can be given forthe difference
in results. First, our evidence shows that it is important to
look at both the passage and the effective dates, and to
look at a relatively large window on either side of the event
dates. (The BFS study uses a window beginning 30 days
prior to passage and ending 30 days after passage.)
Indeed, we too find positive (but individually insignificant)
coefficients for the third, second, and first period leads in
our Partial Model with passage dates, but the sum of lead,
contemporaneous and lag coefficients is negative.
Second, the BFS control variable is based on bank
stock returns in states that did not concurrently pass their
own legislation. It is unclear to what degree the passage
dates in the BFS data set coincide. If there is significant
coincidence, the BFS methodology presents a potentially
serious endogeneity problem. This is because the timing
of interstate banking legislation in various states may be
dependent on factors such as the condition of banks and
the competitive environment in those states. These factors
may also independently influence differences between
bank stock returns, thereby biasing regression results.
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